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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTRICITY-WATER-CLIMATE CHANGE
NEXUS USING A STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION APPROACH
by
Ivan Saavedra-Antol´ınez
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor Vishnuteja Nanduri Ph.D.
Climate change has been shown to cause droughts (among other
catastrophic weather events) and it is shown to be exacerbated by the
increasing levels of greenhouse gas emissions on our planet. In May 2013,
CO2 daily average concentration over the Pacific Ocean at Mauna Loa
Observatory reached a dangerous milestone of ≈ 400 ppm, which has not
been experienced in thousands of years in the earth’s climate. These levels
were attributed to the ever-increasing human activity over the last 5-6
decades. Electric power generators are documented by the U.S. Department
of Energy to be the largest users of ground and surface water and also to be
the largest emitters of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Water
shortages and droughts in some parts of the U.S. and around the world are
becoming a serious concern to independent system operators in wholesale
electricity markets. Water shortages can cause significant challenges in
electricity production having a direct socioeconomic impact on surrounding
regions. Several researchers and institutes around the world have
ii
highlighted the fact that there exists an inextricable nexus between
electricity, water, and climate change. However, there are no existing
quantitative models that study this nexus. This dissertation aims to fill this
vacuum.
This research presents a new comprehensive quantitative model that studies
the electricity-water-climate change nexus. The first two parts of the
dissertation focuses on investigating the impact of a joint CO2 emissions
and H2O usage tax on a sample electric power network. The latter part of
the dissertation presents a model that can be used to study the impact of a
joint CO2 and H2O cap-and-trade program on a power grid. We adopt a
competitive Markov decision process (CMDP) approach to model the
dynamic daily competition in wholesale electricity markets, and solve the
resulting model using a reinforcement learning approach.
In the first part, we study the impacts of different tax mechanisms using
exogenous tax rate values found in the literature. We consider the
complexities of a electricity power network by using a standard
direct-current optimal power flow formulation. In the second part, we use a
response surface optimization approach to calculate optimal tax rates for
CO2 emissions and H2O usage, and then we examine the impacts of
implementing this optimal tax on a power grid. In this part, we use a
multi-objective variant of the optimal power flow formulation and solve it
using a strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm. We use a 30-bus IEEE
power network to perform our detailed simulations and analyses. We study
iii
the impacts of implementing the tax policies under several realistic
scenarios such as the integration of wind energy, stochastic nature of wind
energy, integration of PV energy, water supply disruptions, adoption of
water saving technologies, tax credits to generators investing in water
saving technologies, and integration of Hydro power generation. The third
part, presents a variation of our stochastic optimization framework to
model a joint CO2 and H2O cap-and-trade program in wholesale electricity
markets for future research.
Results from the research show that for the 30-bus power grid, transition
from coal generation to wind power could reduce CO2 emissions by 60%
and water usage about 40% over a 10-year horizon. Electricity prices
increase with the adoption of water and carbon taxes; likewise, capacity
disruptions also cause electricity prices to increase.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The security and prosperity of all nations in the twenty-first century are
directly connected with smart and sustainable management of both energy
and water resources. In the United States, it is well known that the electricity
industry is the single largest contributor of greenhouse gases (GHGs) causing
climate change and is also one of the largest consumers of ground and surface
water. Climate change is known to drastically affect water availability, which
in turn affects the operation of new power plants undermining the energy
security goals of the nation. Clearly, electricity, water, and climate change
are inextricably linked to each other. This relationship, however, has not
been considered by the policymakers who continue to tackle energy, water,
and climate change management policies as disjointed issues. This approach
could be myopic and could have severe consequences in the future.
Climate change has been shown to have a negative effect on the daily
2lives of humans, since it impacts the availability and quality of basic natu-
ral resources that are essential for a healthy life such as air and water. In
the U.S., records for high temperatures have been broken in past two years
with 2012 being the hottest year on record. Over the last two years, the U.S.
population has faced catastrophic climate-related disasters with some regions
experiencing strong hurricanes and tropical storms (e.g., Super Storm Sandy
in October of 2012, causing blackouts, floods, deaths and economic losses
across the region); while others experiencing large wildfires due to extreme
heat and dry weather (e.g., Waldo Canyon Wild Fire in 2012 is the most
expensive in history, destroying thousands of homes and businesses). Fur-
thermore, other ecosystem impacts due to climate change such as droughts
leading to challenges in irrigation for farmers and other socioeconomic dam-
ages for the general public have been reported [2].
In large countries like China and India, population at the middle income
level is increasing rapidly leading to a dramatic increase in demand for more
electricity. Even at the domestic level, demand for electricity is on the rise
albeit not at the same rate. As a consequence of this increasing demand,
electricity production from dominant technologies (coal, gas, nuclear) is also
increasing, thereby releasing large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions, using
up large quantities of water and also causing negative impacts on the climate.
In May 2013, CO2 daily average concentration over the Pacific Ocean at
Mauna Loa Observatory reached a dangerous milestone of ≈ 400 ppm, which
has not been experienced in thousands of years in the earths climate. Similar
3significant increases in CO2 concentrations in the air have also been detected
by many observatories around the world, reigniting the discussions of climate
change and the role of greenhouse gas emissions.
In 2012, Nebraska experienced power outages because demand exceeded
records of electricity usage. It is very likely that there will be more water-
stressed regions in the U.S. as the temperatures are expected to increase
between two to four degrees Celsius over the next decade. It was noted in [3]
that on the one hand power plants experienced water shortages, while on the
other hand some power generators faced the challenge of hotter than usual
water which affected the efficiency of their cooling systems.
Similarly, records of low precipitation in the Midwest have also been bro-
ken in 2012 due to dry conditions and high pressures, affecting thermoelectric
generation given their high water consumption. In the case of the thermo-
electric power plants, dry conditions could result in a decrease in power
generation. As noted in [2] in 2011, Texas thermoelectric power plants were
affected due to droughts and were under a high risk of being shutdown.
Other similar cases of electricity generation reduction due to droughts were
experienced in California and Missouri hydropower plants.
Some federal and individual state-level environmental initiatives have
been introduced to increase greener power production, increase energy ef-
ficiency, and reduce carbon emissions. Some of these plans include carbon
cap-and-trade (in California and RGGI regions) and renewable portfolio stan-
dards (in over two dozen states). Cap-and-trade programs for controlling
4GHG emissions and their impact on wholesale electricity markets have been
studied extensively in the literature. Carbon taxation is a command-and-
control approach to reduce GHGs. The fundamental difference between a
cap-and-trade program and a tax program is that a tax fixes the price on
CO2 emissions and expects that the emissions would adjust as a result. On
the other hand, a cap-and-trade program controls the quantity of emissions
and expects prices to follow suit [4]. Proponents of a tax scheme argue that
it is a much more stable mechanism since entities subject to taxes have a
direct price signal without unnecessary volatility. Given the current aversion
of businesses to price and regulatory uncertainties, perhaps, a tax mechanism
is a plausible alternative.
The debate as to which carbon reducing mechanism (tax or cap-and-
trade) is better is an ongoing one and there is no unanimous agreement
among researchers or policy makers. While world leaders are taking some ac-
tions about the climate change issues related to energy, the electricity-water-
climate change nexus has not been studied in great detail and is starting to
become a serious concern. Since there are no existing quantitative models
that examine this nexus, the goal of this research is to study this nexus under
a joint CO2 emissions and H2O usage tax for both water usage and carbon
emissions, and then present the directions needed to use this model to study
a joint CO2 emissions and H2O usage cap-and-trade program.
51.1 Electricity-Water-Climate Change Nexus
As noted in [5, 6], electricity production requires water, and water supply,
transport, and purification requires electricity. As such, the growing demand
for more energy will drive the demand for more water and vice-versa. Elec-
tricity production generates a tremendous amount of carbon dioxide (and
other greenhouse gases), leading to climate change. On the other hand, cli-
mate change has been shown to cause severe water shortages, in turn affecting
the electricity generation ([7]). Extremely high usage of water is ubiquitous
in every facet of the energy sector, including extraction, refining, processing,
electric power generation, storage, and transport. It also has a devastating
impact on downstream water quality because of waste streams, runoff from
mining operations, and noxious emissions. [5] have done some of the pioneer-
ing work in shining the spotlight on the electricity-water nexus. It is noted in
([8–10]) that on average, thermoelectric generators use more water than the
entire U.S agricultural and horticultural industry. A tremendous amount
of water is required for thermoelectric power plants to support electricity
generation, the highest demand coming from cooling water for condensing
steam.
While power generators return a significant percentage of water back to
the source, the returned water is at a higher temperature causing heat pollu-
tion, which affects the surrounding ecosystem. The returned water is also of
much lower quality, thereby requiring significant further energy expenditure
6on purification for any future human use. Furthermore, water withdrawal for
energy production causes a significant strain to the amount of water avail-
able for simultaneous use in the ecosystem and human consumption. It is
to be emphasized that up to 3.3 billion gallons of water is consumed each
day by power plants. [5] note that due to increasing population, rising en-
ergy demands, and water shortages, the U.S. could have close to two dozen
water crisis areas in the next decade. These areas include some of the na-
tion’s most populous metropolitan centers that may have to trade-off between
water-usage for human consumption and electricity production. Clearly, such
trade-offs can have devastating impacts on the economy; hence, a coherent
electricity-water-climate change policy is needed to avert a national crisis.
It is unfortunate that given the importance of this area of research, there
are no model-based quantitative studies that comprehensively examine the
electricity-water-climate change nexus. This research is targeted at remedy-
ing this situation. Some other qualitative reports discussing the electricity-
water nexus include ([11–16]) and a quantitative tool for water use estimation
was developed by Argonne National Lab ([10]).
It can be seen from Figure 1.1a that the electricity sector is the largest
emitter of CO2 followed by transportation, industry, and residential users.
Also note in Figure 1.1b, that thermoelectric power plants are the largest
users of ground and surface water in the U.S., followed by irrigation, public
usage, and industry. In this research we focus our attention solely on the
electricity generation sector.
7(a) CO2 Emissions (b) H2O Usage
Figure 1.1: Emissions and water usage by sector
1.2 Big Picture
The fundamental contribution of this research is to develop a comprehen-
sive stochastic optimization and simulation framework that connects three
important components: electric power generation, CO2 emissions, and wa-
ter usage. We investigate the impact of a potential tax policy prescription
on electric power markets with the goals of reducing CO2 emissions and re-
ducing water usage. To ensure realism in the model, this research considers
all the intricacies that can manifest in a real life power grid: transmission
constraints, power balance constraints, bus angle constraints, supply, and
demand constraints.
This research studies the impact of a fixed CO2 and H2O tax combination
and a calculated optimal CO2 and H2O tax policy by imposing it on a power
market. The power market model we adopt in this research is a wholesale
8independent system operator-based one that is used in over two dozen states
in the U.S. The wholesale power market operation is discussed in detail in the
Literature Review section of this dissertation. We also model the complex
dynamic daily bidding behavior of power generators using a stochastic game
setting. Our model captures most of the realistic elements of how power mar-
kets operate and how market participants (e.g., generators) interact with it on
a daily basis. This dissertation also examines several realistic scenarios such
as wind energy integration, impact of stochasticity of wind, long-term water
supply disruptions, adoption of water saving technologies, inclusion of clean
coal technologies, tax credits, and integration of hydro power generation. We
finally present directions needed to use our model to study the impacts of a
joint CO2 and H2O cap-and-trade program on wholesale electricity markets.
1.3 Outline
The relevant literature review and concepts for this research are discussed
in Chapter 2. We present an overview of the wholesale electricity markets
to understand the essence of the market competition and the role of inde-
pendent system operators in the day-ahead operations on wholesale electric
power markets. Subsequently, we present an overview of tax policies, we
discuss the current mechanisms proposed by policy makers and their actual
U.S. environmental policies to mitigate CO2 emissions. We also discuss the
optimal power flow problem which is used by the independent system opera-
9Figure 1.2: Stochastic optimization and simulation framework
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tor to determine dispatch quantities and locational marginal prices under the
real complexities of a power grid, followed by a summary of the optimization
approaches commonly used to solve this problem and a multi-objective vari-
ant of the optimal power flow problem. In addition, we present a review of
the climate policy models found in the literature in which it can be seen that
there is no other model that consider the dynamic behavior of the electricity
market participants and the electricity-water-climate change nexus as we are
do in this research. In Chapter 3, we introduce the mathematical formula-
tions and the solution approaches used to model the generator’s competing
behavior in wholesale markets and the intricacies of a real power grid. A
competitive Markov decision process is presented to model the generator’s
bidding problem in competitive wholesale electricity markets and the rein-
forcement learning approach used as the solution approach to this model is
also presented. A standard direct-current optimal power flow formulation
is presented to represent the real properties of a power grid, as well as the
interior point method used to solve this problem. Similarly, we also present a
multi-objective variant of the direct-current optimal power flow formulation
which is solved using a evolutionary strength Pareto algorithm. In Chapter
4, we present the comprehensive numerical analysis and conclusions of the
impacts of implementing tax policies in wholesale electricity markets. Fi-
nally in Chapter 5, we present an overview of cap-and-trade programs, basic
concepts, and directions to be followed in our model in order to study the im-
pacts of a joint CO2 and H2O cap-and-trade program on wholesale electricity
11
markets.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Review of Relevant Literature and Concepts
This chapter discusses the key concepts of the dissertation and the state of
the literature in this area. We discuss the operation of wholesale electric-
ity markets, cap-and-trade programs, carbon taxation, optimal power flow,
competitive Markov decision processes, and reinforcement learning.
2.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets
A wholesale electricity market is a system where a set of power companies
compete with one another with the interest of supplying electricity to meet
the system’s demand from large wholesale customers. The U.S. electricity
industry has been evolving from regulated markets with vertically integrated
monopolies where power systems are regulated by a government agency,
13
which sets the prices for the electricity; to deregulated wholesale markets
with a more diverse industry that promotes competition by allowing power
generators to make supply offers, resulting in a variety of purchase options
for large electricity retailers or load serving entities [17]. These restructured
wholesale markets are typically administered by an independent system op-
erator (ISO), which is a non-profit entity. Readers are referred to [17–19] for
detailed description of restructured markets and other terminology.
The transactions in a wholesale electricity market occur in two types of
markets: the day-ahead (DA) energy markets and the real-time (RT) energy
markets. First, the day-ahead energy market calculates an hourly electricity
price for the next day, as well as the dispatch quantities to be assigned to
every supplier based on generation offers from suppliers and demands bids
from wholesale customers (transactions are settled daily); and second, the
real-time market which is a spot market, balances the deviations between
the day-ahead scheduled electricity dispatch quantities and the actual real-
time operational requirements in the system, given that the demand, the
generation capacities, and the system conditions can vary (transactions are
settled hourly or even as often as every 5 minutes).
In DA energy markets as shown in figure 2.1, on day D both generators
and consumers, submit price-quantity supply offers in $/MWH and demand
bids in MWH respectively to an Independent System Operator (ISO) before
the operating day D+1. The ISO is the entity that coordinates all the trans-
actions in a power grid, responsible for solving a complex network flow model
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(presented in detail in Section 2.4) that accounts for constraints related to
transmission, generation capacities, and demands, and returns the respective
dispatch quantities scheduled for every generator in the system and the lo-
cational prices for the next operating day. In the U.S., currently, there are
seven independent system operators providing two-thirds of the electricity
demanded: California independent system operator (CAISO), electric relia-
bility council of Texas (ERCOT), Midwest independent transmission system
operator (MISO), ISO New England (ISO-NE), New York independent sys-
tem operator (NYISO), PJM interconnection (PJM), and southwest power
pool (SPP). In this research we focus our attention on the day ahead segment
of wholesale electricity markets.
2.3 Carbon Taxes
It has been noted in the literature that the purpose of a tax policy is to change
a particular consumer behavior associated with a specific good. Furthermore,
in the context of non-fiscal taxation, the purpose is to produce a certain
economic or social effect and alter private sector choices independently of the
revenue in order to meet specific government goals [20, 21]. Policy makers
have proposed carbon taxes as an environmental policy instrument to reduce
the amount of carbon emissions due to electricity generation [22, 23] by
directly taxing the quantities of carbon emissions produced by the sources
(coal, oil, gas generators). The revenue obtained from taxes is expected to
15
Figure 2.1: Energy market model
be invested in green and efficient energy related projects. There are several
goals of implementing a tax policy [24]: to raise revenues, to provide economic
stimulus, to achieve social objectives, and to correct market failures. In this
research, one of our goals is to examine the effects of imposing such taxes
on both CO2 emissions and water usage in wholesale electricity markets.
What implications do different tax rates have on electricity prices? What
implications do tax rates have on power generator profits, consumer welfare,
and supply shares. These are some of the fundamental questions we examine
via this dissertation.
Current U.S. energy tax incentives and rebate policies are described well
16
in the 2012 CRS report to congress [24]; some of the measures include: cred-
its for investing in clean coal facilities, credits for electricity production and
investment in renewable sources, and credits for energy efficiency. Similarly,
tax incentives are being used in the European Union (EU) in order to stim-
ulate the use of green energy technologies. In [23], it was noted that most of
the countries with the highest increases in green electricity generation in the
EU were those where a tax incentive was implemented. Similar findings are
reported from simulations of the impacts of a carbon tax on economies like
China [25] and South Africa [26].
Carbon tax proposals have been presented to the U.S. Congress (H.R.
594 by Stark [27], H.R. 1337 by Larson [28], H.R. 2380 by Inglis [29], and
H.R. 1683 by McDermott [30]), however, they have not been considered as the
principal tool for energy and climate change legislations because of particular
design elements. Proponents of carbon taxes note that they provide cost
certainty given that the tax rate is known ahead of time, but it does not
present certainty in benefits (i.e., desired reductions of carbon emissions).
However, there is no a clear agreement about whether is better to have
cost certainty or benefit certainty [31], since sometimes the tax rate can be
adjusted in order to correct this uncertainty. Metcalf and Weisbach [32] noted
that an appropriate CO2 tax should be equal to the social marginal damages
from producing an additional unit of carbon dioxide emissions. However,
computing social marginal damages is an extremely complex challenge as
noted in the Stern Review [33]. It is noted in [33] that estimating the social
17
cost of carbon is a complex multi-stage process involving the assessment
of effects of greenhouse gases on temperature, regional impacts assessment,
rates of technical progress, potential abatement investments, and so on.
In this research, we investigate the three different tax schemes proposed
for carbon-dioxide emissions by Metcalf and Weisbach [32]: We use our model
as a vehicle for understanding the impacts of such tax mechanisms on com-
plex wholesale electricity market operations.
2.4 Optimal Power Flow
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems have been used by independent system
operators to minimize cost of electricity production subject to electric power
network constraints, to identify dispatch quantities and locational marginal
prices. However, several formulations have been studied for about 50 years in
the literature making specific assumptions and varying the objective function,
constraints, or both. The standard OPF problem seeks to minimize the total
generation cost subject to balance power injection constraints, branch flow
limits, bus angles limits, and power injection limits. The real-world prac-
tical formulation of the OPF problem is known as the alternating current
optimal power flow (ACOPF) problem. The ACOPF was first formulated
by Carpentier in 1962. It has been shown to be a very difficult problem to
solve [34] due to the nonlinearities in the objective function and constraints
and because it considers both active and reactive power at the same time,
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notwithstanding the large size of real wholesale electricity markets. Given
this complexity, a simplified linearized version, the direct current optimal
power flow (DCOPF) problem is mostly used in the electricity market liter-
ature to study OPF problems. In some DCOPF formulations the objective
function is nonlinear but with a linear set of constraints, and it only considers
active power injections.
Several methods have been studied to solve the OPF problem as noted in
[35], most of which can be subdivided into the following three basic categories:
deterministic methods for solving the OPF, stochastic methods for solving
the OPF, and hybrid methods.
[36] presents an excellent survey about deterministic optimization meth-
ods to solve the OPF problems, including gradient methods (RG), Newton
methods, simplex method, sequential linear programming (SLP), sequential
quadratic programming (SQP), and interior point methods (IPMs) for non-
linear or quadratic formulations. It is also noted by [37] that several non-
deterministic methods have been applied to the OPF problem. They include
Ant colony optimization (ACO), artificial neural networks (ANN), bacterial
foraging algorithms (BFA), chaos optimization algorithms (COA), variety of
evolutionary algorithms (EAs), particle swarm optimization (PSO), simu-
lated annealing (SA), and Tabu search (TS). For details readers are referred
to [36] and [37]. Both deterministic and non-deterministic methods have
their own advantages and disadvantages. For instance, most deterministic
methods can not easily handle discrete variables, non-convex, and complex
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formulations, while non-deterministic methods can handle these effectively;
however, they are usually computationally intensive and sensitive to param-
eters chosen.
2.4.1 Multi-objective Optimization
There are several papers in the literature that have solved the optimal power
flow problem with multiple objectives using non-deterministic/artificial in-
telligence methods. In our research, for one of the cases we studied, we
adopted a multi-objective approach for tackling the optimal power flow prob-
lem. There are several variants of the OPF problem from a multi-objective
standpoint including multi-objective economic dispatch problem (MOEDP)
and variants of the multi-objective optimal power flow problem (MOOPF).
For the sake of brevity, we have summarized these contributions in the table
below.
2.5 Climate Policy Modeling
Climate Policy Modeling: Research in the area of climate policy model-
ing and analysis with respect to electricity markets (without any water policy
component) has progressed along two distinct lines. The first is large-scale
simulation-based models ([4, 54–62]) and the second is mathematical
programming based (theoretical) models ([63–68]). However, none of
these papers consider the dynamic gaming behavior, adaptive learning be-
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Table 2.1: Multi-objective techniques to solve MOOPF
Technique Minimize Source
Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithms
(SPEA)
1. Fuel cost
[38]
2. Emissions
1. Real power cost
[39]
2. Voltage stability index
Enhanced Genetic Algorithm (EGA)
1. Fuel cost
[40]2. Real power losses
3. Voltage stability index
Particle Swarm Algorithms (PSA)
1. Fuel cost
[41]
2. Emissions
1. Generation cost
[42]
2. Emissions
3. Transmission losses
4. Voltage stability index
Simulated Annealing (SA)
1. Power losses
[43]2. Emissions
3. Severity index
Bees Algorithms (BA)
1. Fuel cost
[44]2. Emissions
3. Real power losses
Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm
(NSGA)
1. Fuel cost
[45]
2. Emissions
1. Real power losses
[46]
2. Voltage stability index
Gravitational Search Algorithms (GSA)
1. Fuel cost
[47]2. Transmission losses
3. Voltage deviation
Differential Evolution Algorithms (DEA)
1. Fuel cost
[48]2. Emissions
3. Real power losses
1. Fuel cost
[49]
2. Emissions
Harmony Search Algorithm (HSA)
1. Fuel cost
[50]
2. Emissions
1. Fuel cost
[51]
2. Emissions
Bacterial Foraging Algorithm (BFA)
1. Fuel cost
[52]
2. Emissions
1. Fuel cost
[53]
2. Emissions
havior, and repeated interactions of electricity market participants. This
dissertation, on the other hand, develops a comprehensive CMDP model
that considers the dynamic gaming behavior. The proposed reinforcement
learning based solution approach incorporates the realistic adaptive learning
behavior of numerous market participants.
Solution Approaches for Dynamic Stochastic Games: A critical as-
pect in the study of dynamic stochastic games (such as CMDPs) is the re-
ward mechanism, common forms of which are discounted reward, average
reward, and total reward. In the repeated game environment of a day-ahead
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market, the rewards from the bids are realized within a day, and, hence,
average reward appears to be the most appropriate reward criterion. The
reward criterion significantly impacts the existence of equilibria of stochastic
games. For example, discounted reward non-zero sum CMDPs are guaran-
teed to have at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. But, the question
whether, with respect to the average reward criterion, equilibrium solutions
always exist for non-zero sum games is still open ([69]).
No exact computational method exists for obtaining the Nash equilib-
ria of a non-zero sum average reward stochastic game. The difficulty of
computation arises from the complex nature of interactions among the com-
peting decisions of the participants, probabilities of state transitions, and the
reward structure. In the recent years, algorithms based on a stochastic ap-
proximation method (known as reinforcement learning) have been presented
in literature to solve stochastic games.
2.5.1 Brief background about Reinforcement Learning
(RL)
The theory of RL is founded on two important principles: Bellman’s equation
and the theory of stochastic approximation ([70, 71]). Any learning model
contains four basic elements: system environment (simulation model), learn-
ing agents (market participants), set of actions for each agent (action spaces),
and system response (participant rewards).
Consider a system with three competing market participants. At a decision-
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making epoch when the system is in state s, the three learning agents that
mimic the market participants select an action vector (a = (a1, a2, a3)  A).
These actions and the system environment (model) collectively lead the sys-
tem to the next decision-making state (say s′). As a consequence of the action
vector (a) and the resulting state transition from s to s′, the agents get their
rewards (r1(s, a, s′), r2(s, a, s′)), and r3(s, a, s′)) from the system environ-
ment. Using these rewards, the learning agents update their knowledge base
(R-values, also called reinforcement value) for the most recent state-action
combination encountered (s, a). The updating of the R-values is carried out
slowly using a small value for the learning rate, which completes a learning
step. At this time the agents select their next actions based on the R-values
for the current state s′ and the corresponding action choices. The policy of
selecting an action based on the R- values is often violated by adopting a
random choice, which is known as exploration, since this allows the agents
to explore other possibilities. The probability of taking an exploratory ac-
tion is called the exploration rate. Both learning and exploration rates are
decayed during the iterative learning process. This process repeats and the
agent performances continue to improve. In the proposed RL algorithm, the
current average reward values are also learned to avoid large fluctuations.
After continuing learning for a large number of steps, if the R-values for all
state-action combinations converge, the learning process is said to be com-
plete. The converged R-values are then used to find a stable policy for each
of the agents. A rationale for the above R-value updating scheme can be
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found in the reinforcement learning literature ([72], [73]).
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Chapter 3
Mathematical Formulation and
Solution Framework
3.1 Problem Statement
This research aims to understand the electricity-water-climate change nexus
by first studying the impact of taxation policy in wholesale electric power
markets with the goals of reducing carbon dioxide emissions and water us-
age by electric power generators, and second by proposing a comprehensive
framework to study the impact of a cap-and-trade policy in wholesale elec-
tric markets to also reduce CO2 emissions and H2O usage. For this pur-
pose, we model the electric power generator’s bidding problem as a competi-
tive Markov decision process (CMDP) and we solve it using a reinforcement
learning approach (RL). This dissertation is subdivided into two main thrust
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areas: 1) implications of carbon and water tax policies on electric power
markets and 2) a model to study the potential implications of a joint water
and carbon cap-and-trade policy on electric power markets.
The first area is further examined in two separate studies:
1. In the first study, we impose exogenous tax rates (from literature) for
both water and CO2 on electric power markets and study their impact
in detail. In order to consider the intricacies of a power grid, we use the
standard DCOPF formulation as shown in Section 3.2. The objective
function of this problem consists of minimizing costs related to: power
generation, CO2 emissions, and water usage. The mathematical model
and solution approach are presented in sections 3.2 and 3.5 respectively.
2. In the second study, we calculate the optimal tax rates using a response
surface methodology and then study the impact of these optimal tax
rates in electric power markets. The OPF formulation we use in this
study is a multi-objective one that includes the minimization of three
separate objective functions: the generation cost, the cost related to
CO2 emissions, and the cost related to water usage. The mathematical
model and the multi-objective OPF’s solution approach are presented
in sections 3.3 and 3.6 respectively.
The overall research objectives of this dissertation are as follows:
1. Develop a stochastic optimization framework to evaluate the energy-
water-climate change nexus.
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Figure 3.1: Core components under study
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2. Perform a detailed study of the impacts of a new joint water and carbon
tax mechanism on electric power generators to limit water usage and
control CO2 emissions.
- exogenous tax rates
- calculation of optimal tax rates for a given power grid
3. Under taxation policies, investigate several real world scenarios encom-
passing wind energy integration, stochasticity of wind energy, long-term
water supply disruptions, adaptation of water saving technologies, in-
clusion of clean coal technologies, tax credits, and integration of hydro
power generation.
4. Propose a model to study the impacts of a cap-and-trade program on
electric power generators to limit H2O usage and CO2 emissions.
In the following sections we present the mathematical formulations used
to model the traditional optimal power flow problem, the multi-objective
optimal power flow problem, the electric power generator’s bidding problem;
followed by the individual solution approaches for each of them.
3.2 Mathematical Formulation of the DC-Optimal Power
Flow
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the optimal power flow problem can be for-
mulated as an alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) problem or
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as an direct current optimal power flow (DCOPF) problem. Because the
difficulties of solving an ACOPF described in Section 2.4, the DCOPF for-
mulation is mostly used in the electricity market literature to study OPF
problems. The DCOPF problem consists of a set of linear constraints and
seeks the minimization of the total cost of meeting the active power demand
of the system. The general formulation is presented below.
min
Θ,Pg
ng∑
i=1
f iP (p
i
g) (3.1)
subject to
gP (Θ, Pg) = BbusΘ + Pbus,shift + Pd +Gsh − CgPg = 0 (3.2)
hf (Θ) = BfΘ + Pf,shift − Fmax ≤ 0 (3.3)
ht(Θ) = −BfΘ− Pf,shift − Fmax ≤ 0 (3.4)
Θrefi ≤ Θi ≤ Θrefi , i ∈ Iref (3.5)
pi,ming ≤ pig ≤ pi,maxg , i = 1...ng (3.6)
• Equation (3.1) minimizes the total cost of meeting active power de-
mands, where Θ are the voltage angles, Pg denotes the real power
injections, ng is the number of generators, and f
i
P is a piecewise linear
cost function of generator i.
• Equation (3.2) balances the real power injections in the system, where
gP (Θ, Pg) are the load injections, Bbus are the bus voltage angles,
29
Pbus,shift is the shift injection vector, Pd is the real power demand,
Gsh are the generation shift factors, and Cg is a binary variable that
identifies the location of a generator.
• Equations (3.3) and (3.4) represent the branch flow limits, where hf is
the branch flow from a specific bus, ht is the branch flow to a specific
bus, Bf are the shunt susceptance values, Pf,shift is the shift injection
vector for the from bus, and Fmax is the vector of flow limits.
• Equation 3.5 maintains the bus angles Θi within the bounds Θrefi , where
Iref is the set of bus indices for the reference buses.
• Equation 3.6 controls the real power injections (pig) within lower and
upper limits pi,ming and p
i,max
g respectively.
In this research, we assess the performance of power generators in a whole-
sale electricity market under different CO2 and H2O tax mechanisms. We,
therefore, introduce two new terms in the objective function described above.
Hence, the modified objective function can be written as follows.
min
Θ,Pg
ng∑
i=1
f iP (p
i
g) + f
i
CO2
(pig) + f
i
H2O
(pig), (3.7)
where f iCO2 represents the preset tax on CO2 emissions and f
i
H2O
denotes the
preset tax on water usage. The solution approach used to solve the DCOPF
problem is presented in Section 3.5.
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3.3 Mathematical Formulation of the Multi-objective
DC-Optimal Power Flow Model
The multi-objective DC-optimal power flow problem (MODCOPF) is a mod-
ification of the DCOPF problem presented in the previous section 3.2, which
has a linear set of constraints and minimizes the total cost of meeting the
active power demand in the system. In this section, we modify the DCOPF
formulation by adding two additional objective functions: 1) minimize the
total cost of CO2 emissions and 2) minimize the total cost of water used.
Then the MODCOPF formulation is as follows:
Optimize:
min
Θ,Pg
ng∑
i=1
f iP (p
i
g) (3.8)
min
ng∑
i=1
f iCO2(e
i)(pig) (3.9)
min
ng∑
i=1
f iH2O(w
i)(pig) (3.10)
subject to the same set of constraints (3.2-3.6) presented in 3.2.
• Equation (3.8) minimizes the total cost of meeting active power de-
mands, where Θ are the voltage angles, Pg denotes the real power
injections, ng is the number of generators, and f
i
P is the cost function
of generator i.
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• Equation (3.9) minimizes the total cost of CO2 emissions, where f iCO2
is the tax set for CO2 emissions, e
i is the emission factor of generator
i, and pig are the load injections of all generators.
• Equation (3.10) minimizes the total cost of water used, where f iH2O is
the tax set for water used, and wi is the water usage factor of generator
i.
The solution approach used to solve the MODCOPF problem is presented
in Section 3.6.
3.4 Mathematical Formulation of the Competitive Markov
Decision Process
In this section, the notation for the electricity generator’s bidding problem is
presented and we show how it can be model as a competitive Markov decision
process (CMDP).
We develop a model similar to the one in [74]. Let B denote the set of
buses in the network, and Bs ⊂ B denotes the subset of supply buses (nodes).
Let the number of generators be denoted by N , and M denote the number
of loads in the network. Let G = {1, 2, · · · , N} and L ={1, 2, · · · ,M} denote
the set of generators and the set of loads in the network respectively.
System State: We define the system state for the tth day X t as the total
demand of the most recently completed day. Since demand is a random
variable, it is necessary to discretize it to develop a discrete stochastic model.
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Let the range of possible values for network demand be discretized in U steps.
Our model allows the level of discretization to be as refined as necessary for
the desired modeling accuracy.
Stochastic Process: The random process for the state transition of the
day-ahead market can be defined as X = {X t : t ∈ Z}, where Z is the set of
integers. The value of X t along with the bid submitted on the tth day dictate
the system state of (t + 1)th day, X t+1. Clearly, the X process satisfies the
Markov property. This along with other characteristics such as discrete and
finite system states and time homogeneity assumption for the stochastic load
realization process (within a demand season), make the X process a Markov
chain.
CMDP Notation: Let the bid decision vector at the tth day be given by
Dt = {Dtl : l ∈ G}, where Dtl is the decision vector of generator l and is
given as Dtl = (Stl ). The element Stl denotes the vector of bid parameters
for each of the 24 hours. The stochastic bidding decision process involves
daily selection of bid parameters by the generators. This stochastic process
is referred to as the decision process, denoted by D = {Dt : t ∈ Z}, where Dt
is the decision vector chosen on the tth day. Since the decision vectors Dtl are
chosen by the generators in a non-cooperative manner, the bidding scenario
characterized by the joint process X and D is a competitive Markov decision
process (CMDP-[69]).
The rewards for the bidding decisions made by the electric power gener-
ators are obtained by solving the DCOPF model presented in Section 3.2 if
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mono-objective setting is applied, or the MODCOPF model presented in 3.3
if multi-objective setting. The solution approach used to solve the CMDP
model is presented in Section 3.7.
3.5 Solution Approach for the DCOPF Model
In order to solve the DCOPF model presented in the Section 3.2, we im-
plement the primal-dual interior point method described in [75] in C++.
A general formulation of an optimization problem is presented below and
the primal-dual interior point method is then explained in relation to the
DCOPF problem.
min
x
1
2
xTHx+ cTx (3.11)
subject to:
l ≤ Ax ≤ u (3.12)
xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax (3.13)
The objective function (Equation 3.11) is quadratic in nature. However,
it can also be used to represent the linear objective function as described in
the DCOPF problem (Equation 3.7). H is the matrix with the quadratic cost
coefficients (this is a matrix of zeros in the DCOPF), c is the vector of linear
cost coefficients (related to each generator’s piecewise linear cost function).
Equation 3.12 describes the linear constraints and Equation 3.13 represents
the bounds on the decision variables (Θ, Pg). A, l, and u denote the matrices
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of coefficients of x, lower, and upper bounds of the linear constraints (related
to real power balancing and branch flow limit equations (3.2, 3.3, 3.4) from
the DCOPF), xmin and xmax in Equation (3.13) are the lower and upper
bounds of the x variables (related to bus angles and real power injection
equations (3.5, 3.6) of the DCOPF). Very briefly, the interior point algorithm
works as follows.
1. The original problem is modified by converting the inequality con-
straints to equality constraints by adding slack variables, and then by
introducing a barrier function to the objective with a parameter value
of γ. When γ converges to zero at the end of the algorithm, the solution
to this modified problem is the same as that of the original.
2. The Lagrangian for this modified equality constrained problem is com-
puted.
3. All the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian are then set to zero in
order to satisfy the first order optimality conditions (Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions).
4. Finally, the Newton’s method [76] is used to solve the KKT conditions
while updating the x variables in each iteration until γ converges to
zero.
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3.6 Solution Approach for the MODCOPF
The multi-objective optimization approach adopted to solve the MODCOPF
described in Section 3.3 was the strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm
(SPEA). In our previous work [77], the SPEA was used successfully for solv-
ing large multi-objective optimization problems in scheduling operations. In
this research, we adopt a similar approach and also utilize the procedure pre-
sented by Zitsler and Thiele [78] for solving the multi-objective OPF. The
SPEA, makes use of the Pareto optimality concept to find the final set of
optimal solutions. This is achieved by performing an iterative evolution pro-
cess making use of the Pareto dominance concept and by performing genetic
operations to create new solutions in every generation until the front set of
solutions cannot be improved any more. The steps of the algorithm are pre-
sented in the following table (Algorithm 1) and we subsequently describe it
in detail.
Step 0) Initialize parameters: Denote MaxGenerations as the maximum
number of generations in the algorithm, numGenerations as the counter of
generations, and MaxPnd as the maximum number of solutions in the non-
dominated set.
Step 1) Generate the initial population:
To create each member of the initial population P , random dispatch
quantities are assigned to all generators, and constraints (3.2) - (3.6) from
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Algorithm 1: SPEA: MultiObjective DCOPF
1 P ← GenerateInitialPopulation()
2 while numGenerations ≤MaxGenerations do
3 F ← CalculateObjectiveFunctions(P )
4 Pnd ← SelectNonDominated(P )
5 if (size(Pnd) > MaxPnd) then
6 Pnd← Clustering(Pnd)
7 fitness← CalculateF itness(P, Pnd)
8 Ps ← SelectionSet(P, Pnd, fitness)
9 Pc ← CrossOver(Ps)
10 Pm ←Mutation(Ps)
11 P ← UpdatePopulation(Pnd, Pc, Pm)
12 numGenerations = numGenerations+ 1
13 Pbest ← FindBestCompromiseSolution(Pnd)
14 LMP ← CalculateLMP (Pbest)
the MO-DCOPF formulation are checked to ensure the feasibility of each
member that is generated.
Step 2) Evaluate the objective functions: Define A = {< A1 >,<
A2 >, · · · , < An >}) such that each member is a tuple containing all three
objective function values based on the dispatch quantities for every member
in P . Recall that the objective functions are: 1) minimize the production
cost (equation 3.8), 2) minimize the CO2 emissions cost (equation 3.9), and
3) minimize the H2O usage cost (equation 3.10).
Step 3) Select the non-dominated solutions: Find Pnd : Ai  Aj,
where i 6= j
Step 4) Clustering: If |Pnd| > P¯nd (where P¯nd is a predefined constant)
reduce Pnd by clustering. First, calculate the Euclidean distance for all com-
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binations of pairs of solutions in Pnd. Second, for the pair of solutions with
the minimal distance, select the solution closest to the centroid and remove
the farthest one. Repeat these steps until |Pnd| = P¯nd.
Step 5) Fitness calculation: The fitness is obtained by finding the
strength of every solution in P and Pnd as described in [79]. For each element
of Pnd, fi = Si, Si=ni/(size(P )+1), where ni is the number of solutions from
P that are dominated by solution i in Pnd; and for every solution j in P ,
calculate fj = 1 +
∑
i,ij Si.
Step 6) Selection set: Create a new set Ps : {Pnd, Prws}, where Prws ⊂
P and is selected by the commonly used Roulette-Wheel Selection (RWS)
method ([80]) based on the fitness values (fi, fj) calculated in the previous
step.
Step 7) Crossover operator: To explore the entire solution space we
then perform a crossover operation as follows. For each pair of consecutive
solutions we apply one of the two commonly used crossover procedures. Draw
a uniform random number between zero and one; if the random number is less
than a pre-defined crossover probability use an arithmetic blended crossover
operation as shown below [81]:
xnew1i = α ∗ xi + (1− α) ∗ yi (3.14)
xnew2i = (1− α) ∗ xi + α ∗ yi, (3.15)
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else if, apply a heuristic crossover operation [81]:
xnew1i = xi + (yi − xi) ∗ α (3.16)
xnew2i = xi − (yi − xi) ∗ α, (3.17)
else, do nothing.
Where xi and yi are the parent solutions and α = Unif(0, 1). All x
new1 and
xnew2 are elements of a new crossover solution set Pc.
Step 8) Mutation operator: Perform a mutation on the solution set Ps
to create a new set Pm.
Step 9) Update population: Concatenate sets Pnd, Pc, and Pm to create
the updated set P . If generations < MaxGen, return to Step2, otherwise set
P becomes the Pareto optimal set of solutions, and then proceed to Step 10.
Step 10) Select the best compromise solution: The fuzzy-based method
presented in [38] is applied to select the best compromise solution from the
optimal Pareto set found in the previous step. For each objective function
of every member in the optimal set, find:
µi =

1, Ai ≤ Amini
Amaxi −Ai
Amaxi −Amini
, Amini < Ai < A
max
i
0, Ai > A
max
i
(3.18)
where Ai is the tuple of objective function values, A
min
i is the minimum of the
objective function values across all solutions for objective i, and Amaxi is the
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maximum of the objective function values across all solutions for objective i.
Then this membership function is normalized using:
µk =
∑Nobj
i=1 µ
k
i∑Nsol
j=1
∑Nobj
i=1 µ
j
i
, (3.19)
where Nobj is the number of objective functions in the problem, Nsol is the
number of solutions in the final set, and k is the index for each solution in
the set. The best compromise solution is that solution k for which µ is the
maximum.
Step 11) Calculate the Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs): Using
the best compromise solution, the LMPs for each bus are calculated as the
cost of supplying an additional MW into the system while satisfying all the
transmission constraints and supply capacity constraints.
3.7 RL Solution Approach for the CMDP Model
Consider that at a decision making epoch, players make decisions which are
sent to the system environment that provides feedback leading the system col-
lectively to the next decision making state. As a consequence of the decisions
and the resulting state transition, players get their rewards from the system
environment. Using these rewards, the players update their knowledge base.
The updating of the knowledge is carried out slowly while players explore
other possibilities in their decision space. This process repeats and the play-
ers’ decision making ability continues to improve and ultimately converges to
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lead to equilibrium decisions. We next present an RL-based algorithm along
the lines of one of our previous papers [74] for solving the CMDP model.
Learning Phase:
1. Initialize the following components of the algorithm:
• Iteration count m = 1.
• For all generators k ∈ G, reinforcement values (R-values) Rk(s) =
0 for all states s ∈ E
• Average reward values ρk = 0.
• Visit counter for each state-action combination (s, ak): n(s, ak) =
0, where ak is an element of the set of all actions Ak(s) available
to generator k in state s.
• Learning rates (αm, βm) and the exploration rate (γm).
• MaxSteps, a large value, is designated as the termination criterion.
2. Start the system simulation in an arbitrary state s.
3. For each player k ∈ N , with probability (1 − γm), choose an action
ak ∈ Ak(s) for which Rk(s, ak) is maximum. With a probability of γm
choose a random (exploratory) action from the set Ak(s)\ak. At m = 1
(i.e., in the first step), choose an action randomly since all the R-values
are zeros.
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4. Send the generator bids to the DCOPF/MODCOPF program (Section
3.2 or 3.3).
5. Solve the DCOPF problem using the primal-dual interior point method
explained earlier (Section 3.5) or the MODCOPF problem using the
strength Pareto evolutionary algorithm presented earlier (Section 3.6).
6. Use the stochastic demands from the DCOPF/MODCOPF to deter-
mine the system state for the next decision epoch. Let the system
state at that epoch be s′.
7. Calculate rk(s, s′, ak), the reward for kth generator resulting from the
actions (a1, · · · aN) chosen by the generators 1 through N in state s
(obtained from the DCOPF/MODCOPF problem).
8. Update ∀k ∈ G the R-values (Rk(s, ak)) and the average reward (ρk)
as follows.
Rknew(s, a
k)← (1− αm)Rkold(s, ak) + αm(rk(s, s′, ak)−
ρkm +R
k
exp(s′)), (3.20)
where
Rkexp(s′) =
∑
ak∈Ak(s′)
pk(s′, ak)Rk(s′, ak), (3.21)
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and
pk(s′, ak) =

(1− γm) if ak = greedy action
γm
Ak(s′)−1 for other actions.
(3.22)
ρjm+1 = (1− βm)ρkm + βm
[
mρkm + r
k(s, s′, ak)
(m+ 1)
]
. (3.23)
9. Set s← s′ and m← m+ 1.
10. Update the learning parameters αm and βm and exploration parameter
γm following the DCM [82] scheme given below:
Θm =
(
Θ0
1 + u
)
, where u =
(
m2
Θτ +m
)
, (3.24)
where Θ0 denotes the initial value of a learning/exploration rate, and
Θτ is a large value (e.g., 10
4) chosen to obtain a suitable decay rate for
the learning/exploration parameters. Exploration rate generally has a
large starting value and a quicker decay, whereas learning rates have
small starting value and very slow decay rates.
11. If m < MaxSteps, go to Step 3, else go to Step 12.
Learned Phase for Profit Calculation:
12. Simulate the system with the final R-values, {Rk(s, ak) : ∀ak ∈ Ak(s), k ∈
43
G, s ∈ E}, and estimate the average profit for each generator. Profits
are computed as the product of locational marginal prices and quanti-
ties supplied less the taxes paid for H2O and CO2. These are assumed
to be stable rewards (profits) realized by the generators in the day-
ahead energy market.
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Chapter 4
Numerical Analysis
This section is divided into two subsections. The first section, present the de-
tailed numerical analysis about the impacts on a wholesale electricity market
when a fixed tax for CO2 emissions and water usage is imposed using different
tax mechanisms. The second section provides the numerical analysis related
to the calculation of an optimal tax rate for a given wholesale electricity
market and the evaluation of the impacts of this optimal tax combination.
4.1 Implementation of a fixed tax rate under different
tax mechanisms
The objective of this section is to assess the impacts of various carbon and
water tax mechanisms, wind energy integration issues, and water supply
disruptions on a wholesale electric power market. To accomplish this task
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we use a 30-bus IEEE power network [83] as a testbed.
4.1.1 Network Details, Generation Costs, and Tax As-
sumptions
We selected a standard 30-bus IEEE power network from [83] and modified
it slightly to suit our problem needs. Extensive details of the power network
are not presented here for the sake of brevity. Interested readers, however,
can find these details in the MATPOWER software package [83]. The 30-bus
IEEE power network showed in figure 4.1 has 6 generators, 24 consumers, and
41 transmission lines. We assume that out of these six generators there are
multiple fuel types, which allows us to assess the impacts of taxes on different
generation technologies. We assume that there are three coal generators
(100 MW each), two natural gas generators (100 MW each), and one nuclear
generator (250 MW).
Based on literature, we made appropriate assumptions about the genera-
tor cost function characteristics (e.g., fixed cost of nuclear being higher than
the others while its operational cost is lower; natural gas has a low fixed
cost and a higher operational cost than the rest). The (Xi, Yi) coordinates
of the 3-part piecewise linear cost functions (base bids) of each of the six
generators are presented in Table 4.1 (Yi represents the price in $/hr and
Xi represents the quantity in MW). Generators are assumed to bid above
the piecewise-linear marginal costs presented in Table 4.1. Each generator
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Figure 4.1: Single line diagram of the IEEE 30-bus test system [1]
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is assumed to have a total of 30 action choices where each bid is 0.5$/hr
over the last bid. For example, the set of actions available for Coal1 are:
{{(0, 80.5), (12, 130.5), (36, 900.5), (60, 3200.5)}; {(0, 81), (12, 131), (36, 901),
(60, 3201)}; . . . ; {(0, 95), (12, 145), (36, 915), (60, 3215)}}. Therefore, each gen-
erator has 30 different piecewise linear functions as action choices. This
number can be increased or decreased as needed by the decision makers.
Consumer demand is assumed to be a normal random variable with the
mean value as shown in Table 4.2 and standard deviation of 5MW for all
consumers. Demand is assumed to increase at the rate of 5% each year.
Transmission line capacity is assumed to be 1300MW throughout the power
network, thereby removing any potential for transmission congestion. We do
this to focus only on the impact of CO2 and H2O taxes. Impact of reduced
transmission capacity that creates congestion can also be studied quite easily
using our stochastic optimization model. Other network parameters of the
IEEE 30-bus network are exactly as provided in the MATPOWER software
package. The CO2 emissions factors based on data from U.S. DOE and water
usage factors from [84], are shown in Table 4.3.
Tax rate values for both CO2 and H2O are obtained from literature and
have a wide variability (e.g., $5/KgCO2 − $95/KgCO2). Tax rates for H2O
have been obtained from research reports of the Australian Water Commis-
sion, which performed an economic valuation of water for electricity genera-
tion [85]. In this section, we used a value of $13/TonCO2 and $500/ML for
carbon-dioxide emissions and water usage respectively. The planning horizon
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Table 4.1: Piecewise linear cost functions of generators
Table 4.2: Demands at each of the 30 buses
we consider is ten years. Longer planning horizons will need the examination
of generation and transmission expansion planning issues, which are beyond
the scope of this research.
In this subsection, we examine four main issues:
1. Impact of different tax schemes (for both water and CO2)
Table 4.3: Emissions and water usage factors
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2. Investment in new wind energy by existing generators (replacement)
3. Integration of additional stochastic clean energy resources (capacity
additions)
4. Long-term disruptions/shortages of water supply (e.g., due to drought)
Figure 4.2 presents the complete step-by-step procedure we adopted for
evaluating each of the four main scenarios presented above.
4.1.2 Impact of Different Tax Schemes (for both water
and CO2)
In this section we analyze the impact of three different tax schemes proposed
for carbon-dioxide emissions by Metcalf and Weisbach [32]. Additionally, in
this section we also impose a new water tax based on the amount of water
used for generating electricity. Such analysis for a joint water and carbon
tax scenario has not been presented in literature before. The three different
tax scenarios we examine are the ones described in Section 2.3: 1) ramping
up, 2) grandfathering, and 3) uniform adoption.
In Figure 4.3, the quantities supplied by each of the six generators are
shown under no-tax (NT), ramping-up (RU), grandfathering (GF), and uni-
form adoption (UN) approaches over a ten-year horizon. In this case the
CO2 and H2O taxes are assumed to increase by $5/KgCO2 each year and
5% each year, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Flowchart of the solution procedure for all scenarios
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Figure 4.3: Quantities supplied by the six generators under different tax
mechanisms over a 10-year horizon
It can be seen in the NT case that the average quantities supplied by
each of the generators are directly related to their cost functions and maxi-
mum capacities. For instance, all the three coal generators supply up to their
maximum capacity (100MW) as demand increases, given that they have the
cheapest production cost; followed by the nuclear generator and then the gas
generators. As expected, under the RU strategy, the average quantities sup-
plied by coal generators are much smaller than the NT case due to the taxes
on CO2 and H2O. Even though the nuclear generator does not emit any
CO2, it uses higher quantities of water than the other generators, however,
nuclear generators are still cheaper than gas generators. Hence, in the RU
case, after the nuclear generator reaches its maximum capacity (250MW),
the coal generators absorb the residual demand in the power network be-
fore gas generators are dispatched. In the GF case one would expect that
coal generation would be higher than that of either RU or UA. However, in
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Figure 4.4: Average Locational Marginal Prices and Average Profits for the
Various Tax Mechanisms over a 10-year Horizon
this specific case study the monetary values between the taxes are not that
different and hence the lack of perceivable variations in quantities supplied.
The differences in profits of coal generators between the tax schemes are
nevertheless clearly visible in Figure 4.4. Under the UN case (Figure 4.3),
the nuclear generator supplies more than under other mechanisms until Year
4, after which its supply quantities are almost the same under all three tax
schemes.
In Figure 4.4 the average locational marginal prices (secondary Y-axis)
under the three different tax mechanisms are shown. The NT scenario serves
as the lower bound on the average LMP, with UN mechanism serving as the
upper bound. These prices could potentially vary a lot more if transmission
capacity becomes insufficient. As expected the prices are in the order of
severity of the tax mechanism. Figure 4.4 also shows the average yearly
profits obtained by all generators across the ten year horizon (primary X-
53
(a) CO2 Emissions (b) H2O Usage
Figure 4.5: Emissions and Water usage Trends under Different Tax Mecha-
nisms
axis). The UN mechanism appears to have the most negative impact on the
profits of coal generators and vice-versa for nuclear generators. The profits
of most generators from the GF scheme, as expected, are higher than RU
and UN but lower than the NT scenario.
From Figure 4.5a, notice that by implementing the UN mechanism, low-
est CO2 emissions are produced by the system, followed by the RU, GF,
and NT mechanisms. However, the reductions in CO2 emissions in this par-
ticular network come at the cost of higher water usage due to the increased
dispatch of nuclear generators. Therefore, in highly water-stressed areas, sys-
tem operators may be better off encouraging investments in renewable energy
technologies rather than ramping up production from nuclear generators. It
can be seen from Figure 4.5b that in most cases the NT scenario acts as
the upper bound for the water usage. While the difference in trends of CO2
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emissions between the tax mechanisms was clear, the water usage trends are
not as clear. We believe this could be due to the relatively lower rate of water
usage tax for each MWh of power generated as compared to CO2 taxes. In
the next section we examine the issue of replacing coal generators with wind
generators.
Note: From this point forward within this section, for the ease
of exposition, all model simulations are performed assuming that
the uniform adoption (UN) tax mechanism is used.
4.1.3 Investment in New Wind Energy by Existing
Generators
In this portion of the study, we assume that the coal generators are replaced
by wind generators of equal capacity (one at a time). As noted in [86], we
assume that the cost characteristics of the wind farm are similar to that of
a nuclear generator (high fixed cost and very low operational cost). A zero
cost can also be assumed in our model as noted in some literature. Figure
4.6 shows the individual supply shares across a ten year horizon when the
coal plants are replaced by wind farms of the same capacity. We perform this
analysis by replacing one coal plant at a time (1Cby1W-refers to replacing
one coal plant by one wind farm; 2Cby2W refers to replacing two coal plants
by two wind farms). Across all the 10 years, in both 1Cby1W and 2Cby2W
cases the wind generators supply to their maximum capacities (100MW)
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Figure 4.6: Supply Shares when Replacing Coal with Wind
immediately. It can be seen that the supply share of the nuclear generator
is reduced significantly as the number of wind generators increases from one
to two. Coal generators begin to see their supply shares rise only when the
demand increases cannot be met by the wind and nuclear generators.
4.1.4 Integration of Additional Stochastic Wind Gen-
erators
The goal of this subsection is to study the system performance due to in-
tegration of additional wind energy resources into the existing power net-
work (unlike the previous replacement case). We also extend the analysis
by studying the impact of stochastic and intermittent nature of wind energy
availability as well as the imposition of a penalty by the system operator on
wind generators if the promised generation capacity is not available. Both
these extensions make the study much more realistic. Wind energy avail-
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Figure 4.7: Integration of Wind Energy in the Power Network
ability is a random variable with overall capacity factors ranging between
20%-40% (with on-site storage, this can be increased further). Therefore,
studying the stochastic nature of wind generation is critical. As in some
papers in the literature [87], we also impose penalties on wind generators
who do not meet their obligations. In Figure 4.7 +1W refers to the addition
of one wind generator (100MW), +2W refers to the addition of two wind
generators (100MW each), +2WSt refers to the addition of two wind gen-
erators with stochasticity, and +2WStPe refers to the addition of two wind
generators with stochastic availability and the imposition of an exogenous
penalty for not being able to meet promised generation.
In the +1W case, the addition of a new wind generator causes a marked
decrease in the amount of nuclear generation. In all the ten years in the +1W
case the wind generator supplies up to its maximum capacity. In the +2W
case also, both wind generators are almost dispatched to their full capacities
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(100MW each) in lieu of nuclear generation, which also prevents any increase
in supply by the coal or natural gas generators.
Modeling the Stochastic Nature of Wind
We incorporated the stochasticity in wind energy availability as follows.
Thirty percent of the time the wind generators are assumed to be fully avail-
able and the rest of the time, the generators are said to be partially available
between 30%−90% of their maximum capacities. While we understand that
the capacity factors in most cases are between 20-40%, these wind generators
could be thought of as those with on-site storage devices. We do not model
wind speed forecasting considerations. For each run (hour) of the simula-
tion we generated random numbers to first determine their initial state of
availability. If the generators are partially available, then the percentage of
partial availability is also determined by drawing random numbers from a
uniform distribution. In the +2WSt case, it can be seen (Figure 4.7) that
the stochastic nature of wind generators has a negative impact on their sup-
ply shares when compared to the +1W and +2W cases. As the demand
increases the wind energy unavailable due to stochasticities is filled in by
the nuclear generator. Coal and natural gas generation, however, remain
relatively stable in all the ten years of the study horizon.
Imposition of a Penalty Factor due to Unavailability of Promised
Wind Generation
We also investigated the impact of potential penalties imposed by system op-
erators on wind generators if promised capacity is not available after bidding
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Figure 4.8: Steps in Modeling the Penalty for Stochasticity of Wind Gener-
ators
in the power market. We incorporated this in our stochastic optimization
model as shown in Figure 4.8. The penalty value we considered is $5/MWh.
This value can be modified as needed. It was noticed that the behavior of all
generators in the +2WStPe case was very similar to the +2WSt case. We
believe that this is due to the low value of penalty that was used for testing
in our sample problem.
In the +1W case (see Figure 4.9a), when the new wind generation dis-
places the nuclear generation, CO2 emissions remain practically unchanged.
The CO2 emissions remain almost the same even with the addition of another
wind generator, since the additional wind generation replaces the nuclear gen-
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(a) CO2 Emissions (b) H2O Usage
Figure 4.9: Emissions and Water usage Trends due to Integration of Wind
Energy
eration. In Figure 4.9b we can see that for water usage, +1W serves as the
upper bound while +2WStPe serves as the lower bound.
4.1.5 Long-term Disruptions/Shortages of Water Sup-
ply
Disruptions in water supply are becoming increasingly frequent due to drought
and other climate-change induced conditions. Power production depends on
water and its shortage has been shown in the literature to cause shutdowns
or reductions in electricity generation capacities ([88, 89]). In this section
we examine the impact of reduction in capacities of power generators due to
long-term water supply shortages as a result of prolonged drought or similar
events. Since nuclear and coal generators are the largest consumers of water,
we first study the impact of water shortages on these generators. We then
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(a) Reduced Capacity of Nuclear Generator (b) Reduced Capacity of Coal Generators
Figure 4.10: Supply Shares under Reduced Capacities due to Water Short-
ages
studied the impact of addition of stochastic wind energy resources in addition
to long-term water supply disruptions.
Impact of Water Shortages on Coal and Nuclear Generators
In this case we assumed that due to prolonged water shortages, capacities
of all the coal generators and the nuclear generator are reduced by half (one
generation technology at a time). In Figure 4.10a, it can be seen that the
nuclear generator with its capacity reduced from 250MW to 125MW, supplies
up to its new maximum capacity for all ten years. The residual demand is
then first absorbed by coal plants followed by the natural gas plants starting
Year six. In Figure 4.10b, where the capacity of coal generators is reduced by
half (50MW each), the nuclear generator supplies up to its maximum capacity
starting Year five. Natural gas generators are only dispatched starting Year
seven. This reordering of dispatch involving gas generation is also reflected
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in increased prices as shown in Figure 4.11a. In this figure, UN N refers to
capacity reduction for nuclear generator, UN C refers to capacity reduction
for coal generators, and UN is the uniform adoption case from Section 4.1.2.
(a) Reduced Capacity of Nuclear Generator
(b) Reduced Capacity of Coal Generators
Figure 4.11: LMPs under Reduced Capacities due to Water Shortages
Joint Impact of Water Shortages and Integration of Stochastic
Wind Energy Resources
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We also extended the case examined in Section 4.1.5 by integrating stochastic
wind energy resources (as in Section 4.1.4) and the imposition of penalties
(as in Section 4.1.4). These extensions make the model as close to a realis-
tic power network as possible. This analysis involves all types of generation
technologies, stochastic demands, stochastic availability of wind power gen-
erators, and water shortages. For the sake of brevity, we present the results
for average prices for the three different cases superimposed over the price
graph from the previous section (see Figures 4.11b and 4.11a). In Figure
4.11b, Case1 refers to +2WStPe scenario from Section 4.1.4, Case2 refers to
both +2WStPe conditions and capacity reductions in coal generation (down
to 70MW each from 100MW) due to water shortages, and Case3 refers to
+2WStPe conditions and capacity reduction in nuclear generation (down to
175MW from 250MW) due to water shortages. It can be observed that in
the case of additional wind generation becoming available, the price increases
that were observed earlier are now prevented. The prices in all three cases
remain below the reference UN case. This can be attributed to the large
amount of wind generation that is included as part of the dispatch, which
does not involve either a water or CO2 tax. Under drought-like conditions,
system operators could prevent price spikes by encouraging investments in
wind or other green technologies.
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Figure 4.12: Total CO2 Emissions across all Scenarios
4.1.6 Overall Scenario Analysis
In this section we present the summary of all the twelve comprehensive sce-
narios we studied in this section with respect to CO2 emissions and H2O
usage (see Figures 4.12 and 4.13). It can be seen that the UN N case acts
as the upper bound on CO2 emissions while the NT case serves as the upper
bound for H2O usage. We believe that if the goal of the system operator is
to minimize both the overall CO2 emissions and H2O usage, the 2CBy2W
(replacing two coal by two wind generators) setting would be ideal. Addition
of wind energy resources has been noted by the Department of Energy as
a comprehensive solution for preventing excessive water withdrawals, espe-
cially in drought prone areas. There is approximately a 60% reduction in
10-year CO2 emissions and 40% reduction in water usage between the NT
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Figure 4.13: Total H2O Usage across all Scenarios
case and the 2CBy2W case.
However, the 2CBy2W setting is not entirely realistic, since it does
not consider stochasticity of wind or penalties due to non-availability. The
+2WStPe case is a good representation of reality, albeit without consider-
ation of water supply disruptions. The UN N case (extension of UN case)
which considers water supply disruptions to the nuclear generator gives an
idea of the negative impact that water shortages could have if there are pro-
longed droughts in a region without any wind/green energy. In the UN C
case (extension of UN case) which considers water supply disruptions to the
three coal generators, the ten year CO2 emissions drops, but the water usage
increases significantly. This is due to the nuclear generator (the largest user
of water) and natural gas generators supplying the residual demand.
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4.1.7 A Note on Computational Time and Resources
The RL-based solution approach is computationally intense. We developed
the code for the RL algorithm as well as the DCOPF problem in C + +. We
executed the code on research computing clusters at University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee. The cluster has 142 compute nodes (1136 cores), each node is a
Dell PowerEdge R410 rack-mount server with two quad-core 2.67 GHz, Intel
Xeon X5550 processors, and 24GB of system memory. All the cases were
simulated for 5000 runs. The base case with six generators took a total of 3
minutes while the largest case with 8 generators with stochastic wind energy
scenario took a total of 9.6 minutes.
4.1.8 Concluding Remarks
In this research we developed a first-of-its-kind quantitative model to study
the electricity-water-climate change nexus. We examine this nexus by impos-
ing H2O usage and CO2 emissions taxes on power generators in a wholesale
electricity market. We adopt a CMDP approach to model the competitive
behavior of power generators who bid daily into a wholesale market un-
der stochastic demand conditions as well as under carbon-dioxide and water
taxes. The CMDP model is solved using a stochastic approximation based
reinforcement learning mechanism. The outputs of the RL algorithm are sta-
ble bidding strategies for all generators which are used to obtain the average
rewards over a demand season.
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This section examined four main scenarios including different tax schemes
proposed in literature, replacement of coal generation by wind, integration
of additional stochastic wind energy resources, and water supply disruptions.
We found that if the goal is to minimize both CO2 emissions and H2O usage,
new green generation should replace coal and nuclear generation. This is also
prescribed by Sovacool and Sovacool in [5]. However, given the political and
practical difficulties in achieving this goal, we also studied the impact of inte-
gration of new wind energy resources which are intermittent and stochastic
but have begun to bid into daily electricity markets. Further the case of
water droughts impacting coal and nuclear generation was also examined.
In this section we used exogenous tax rate values from literature. In the
section 4.2 we conduct a detailed analysis to obtain optimal tax rates for
both carbon and water for a given regional power network. While this has
been noted as an extremely challenging task by Stern Review [33], our model
could be used as a viable tool for such analysis.
4.2 Calculation and implementation of optimal tax rates
The objective of this section is to show the use of our model in obtaining
optimal tax rates for carbon emissions and water usage of a given wholesale
electricity market. Based on a Central Composite Design, different scenarios
of tax rates were created to be simulated. The impositions of all the tax com-
binations were simulated by solving the multi-objective DCOPF presented
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in Section 3.3. The response variable values for each tax combination were
obtained. By response optimizer, the optimal tax rates were identified for
both CO2 and water usage. In addition, we also study the impact of the im-
position of this optimal tax combination on different scenarios of electricity
power networks to analyze the behavior of the energy market.
4.2.1 The Model
Our overall model is developed in two phases as shown in figure 4.14. The
first phase involves the calculation of optimal tax rates using a response sur-
face method, and the second phase involves the imposition of these taxes on
a wholesale power market, which is modeled using a CMDP approach and
solved using the reinforcement learning approach presented in Section 3.7.
4.2.1.1 Calculation of optimal tax rates
In order to find the optimal combination of tax rates for CO2 emissions and
H2O usage, a three-step procedure was used.
1. A Central Composite Design (CCD) framework of response surface
method (RSM, [90]) was used to design the experiment.
2. Response variables for each treatment of the CCD were calculated using
a simulation model of the electric power network. The electric power
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Figure 4.14: Optimal tax rates calculation and evaluation Model
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grid operations were optimized using a multi-objective DCOPF model
(described in detail in Section 3.3).
3. The optimal tax rate treatment combination was calculated using a
response surface optimizer.
4.2.1.2 Response Surface Method
A RSM was used to obtain the optimal combination of CO2 emissions and
H2O usage tax rates that minimize: 1) the total power generation cost,
2) the total CO2 emissions cost, and 3) the total H2O usage cost. A full
CCD with two factors (CO2 and H2O tax rates) was created to identify the
treatments to be simulated on the sample power network. These simulations
were performed by solving a multi-objective optimization model for every
treatment combination in order to obtain the following responses variables:
1) total cost of generation, 2) total CO2 emissions, and 3) total H2O usage.
Finally, a response surface optimization was carried out to obtain the optimal
tax rate combination for the given electric power network.
The Minitab c© response optimizer tool was used to perform the response
surface optimization. This tool implements the common desirability ap-
proach presented in [90] and [91] to optimize multiple responses variables
at the same time. This method uses desirability functions to transform each
response variable into a non-measured individual desirability value; then a
weighted combined desirability function is calculated; and finally a reduced
gradient algorithm is implemented to find the maximum composite desirabil-
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ity for a specific tax rate combination, which is considered to be optimal.
4.2.2 Network Details, Generation Costs, and Tax As-
sumptions
As in Section 4.1.1, we selected the 30-bus IEEE power network found in
Matpower package [92]. This power network has 30 buses, six generators
(2-coal, 2-gas, and 1-nuclear), and 41 transmission lines. We assumed a
maximum electricity generation capacity of 100MW for each coal generator,
100MW for each gas generator, and 250MW for the nuclear generator. The
complete power network details can be found in [92], the one-line diagram is
shown in Figure 4.1. Table 4.4 shows the emissions and water usage factors
for every generation technology simulated. The CO2 emissions tax and H2O
usage tax are the two factors in the response surface analysis. The low val-
ues for each factor were $0/TonCO2 and $0/MLH2O, and high values were
$85/TonCO2 and $900/MLH2O respectively. Our motivation for choosing
these ranges of values for CO2 and H2O taxes was based on openly available
literature about carbon and water tax rates [32, 85]. The advantage of using
a simulation-based optimization model is that one can modify these ranges
as needed to understand their implications.
The complete experimental framework based on a CCD is presented in Ta-
ble 4.5 with the respective response variables obtained from solving the MO-
DCOPF. For instance, in Table 4.5 row 4, for the combination of tax rates of
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$0.085/TonCO2 and $900/MLH2O we solved the MO-DCOPF problem and
obtained the response variables shown in corresponding columns. Minitab c©
statistical software was used to perform the response surface optimization,
and Minitab response optimizer tool was used to obtain the optimal tax rate
combination for the sample electricity network.
Table 4.4: Emissions and water usage factors
GeneratorFuelType KgCO2/MWh MLH2O/MWh
Coal 318.00 0.01325
Gas 184.64 0.00189
Nuclear 0.00 0.001512
Table 4.5: Central Composite Design
Run Factors Response variables
TaxCO2 TaxH2O TotalProdCost TotalCO2Emissions TotalH2OUsage
1 0 0 22098.7 91022.6 4.47
2 0.085 0 22148.1 48123.4 4.71
3 0 900 22657.3 84646.5 2.98
4 0.085 900 22965.8 67606.7 3.36
5 0 450 22711.7 85347.5 2.97
6 0.1026 450 23376.4 67538.5 3.39
7 0.0425 0 22196.7 48647.1 4.70
8 0.0425 1086.4 23355.1 66173.2 3.36
9 0.0425 450 23569.7 65166.5 3.41
10 0.0425 450 24166.5 64261.2 3.36
11 0.0425 450 23499.7 64993.1 3.48
12 0.0425 450 23303.1 65944.3 3.47
13 0.0425 450 23386.9 65734.5 3.45
4.2.3 Finding the optimal tax rates
From Figure 4.15a, notice that the lowest value of the total production cost
is obtained when there is no tax in the system, meaning that coal generators
are the ones supplying most of the electricity demanded in the system. The
highest values of the total production cost are found in the center part of
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(a) Total Production Cost (b) Total CO2 Emissions
(c) Total Water Usage (d) Locational Marginal Prices
Figure 4.15: Contour plots
the Figure 4.15a where gas generators and nuclear generator are the ones
supplying most of the total demand (see Figure 4.16 Combs. 9-13).
From Figure 4.15b, notice that when there are no taxes in the system, the
highest value of CO2 emissions are obtained. This is because coal generators
supply most of the demand as seen in Figure 4.16 (Comb. 1). The same
results are obtained when there is no CO2 tax but H2O tax, in these cases
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Figure 4.16: Supply Shares for the CCD treatments
coal and gas generators supply most of the demand, and the nuclear generator
only supply a small quantity of electricity into the system, (see Figure 4.16
Combs 3 and 5). In contrast, notice that lowest values of CO2 emissions are
found when higher values of CO2 tax are imposed into the system, this is
because nuclear generator becomes the largest supplier of electricity in the
system given that it has the lowest CO2 emission factor, see Figure 4.16
combination 2 and 7.
From Figure 4.15c, notice that with low values of both taxes, high val-
ues of H2O usage are observed, this is because coal generators and nuclear
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generator are the biggest suppliers (see Figure 4.16 Comb. 1). The highest
values of H2O usage are obtained when there is no H2O tax but high CO2
tax, in this case the nuclear generator is the one supplying the larger share
of electricity into the system (see Figure 4.16 Combs. 2 and 7). The lowest
values of H2O usage are obtained when highest values of H2O tax are im-
posed, then gas generators becomes the largest producers of electricity (see
Figure 4.16 Combs. 3 and 5).
When we consider locational marginal prices in Figure 4.15d, notice that
lowest values are observed when both CO2 and H2O taxes are low, while
highest values are observed when tax rates for CO2 and H2O are increased.
After applying the Desirability Method mentioned in Section 4.2.1.2 by
using the Minitab response optimizer tool, it was found that the combination
of $0.0269 for CO2 tax and $1086.39 for H2O usage tax represents the optimal
combination. This tax combination happens to be optimal for the given
sample network when the goal is to minimize all the three objective functions
presented in Section 3.3.
4.2.4 Implementation of optimal tax rates under dif-
ferent tax mechanisms
In this section we present the detailed numerical analysis that were performed
to demonstrate the applicability of our multi-objective optimization and RL
framework to understand the implications of a joint carbon and water tax
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scenario. We study four main cases in this paper:
1. Imposition of the optimal tax rates on a sample power network
2. Adoption of water saving technologies by power generators
3. Impact of tax credits for generators who have invested in water saving
technologies
4. Integration of Hydro power generation
4.2.4.1 Imposition of the Optimal Tax Rates
Figure 4.17: Supply Shares under Optimal Tax Imposition
The goal of this section is to evaluate the impact of the imposition of
the optimal taxes found in the previous section for CO2 emission and H2O
usage. Tax case (Tax) refers to the scenario where the optimal taxes are
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imposed, and is compared against the scenario with no tax (No-Tax). Figure
4.17 shows that natural gas generation behaves as the dominant electricity
supplier for both cases until year 5 when these generators reach their max-
imal capacity. After this, nuclear generation increases rapidly. Notice that
after imposing the optimal CO2 and H2O taxes, coal generation is negatively
impacted and its electricity generation is reduced. Gas generators absorb the
amount of the demand that is not longer fulfilled by the coal generators. In
this scenario, gas generators seems to be a moderate option under the three
objective functions evaluated and presented in Section 3.3.
(a) Total CO2 Emissions (b) Total H2O Usage
Figure 4.18: Emissions and Water Usage under Optimal Tax Imposition
From Figure 4.18a, it is clear that under the imposition of the optimal
taxes, lower CO2 emissions are produced. Similarly, from Figure 4.18b, we
can see that the lower quantities of H2O are used from year 1 to 5. This is
because at year 5, the gas generators reach their maximal capacity of elec-
tricity production, and the new demand is absorbed by the nuclear generator
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which has a higher H2O usage factor than gas generators, but lower than the
coal generator.
4.2.4.2 Adoption of Water Saving Technologies (WST)
In this section, we study the scenario where all electricity generators are
assumed to incorporate water saving technologies in their cooling systems by
using wet-recirculating or closed-loop technologies. For this section and for
the following cases presented in this paper, all cases use the optimal taxes in
the simulations. The water usage factors used for this section are presented in
the Table 4.6 as noted in [93]. Notice that by using water saving technologies
the usage factors are reduced.
Table 4.6: Water Usage Factors under Closed-Loop Technology
Technology MLH2O/MWh
No−WST With−WST
Coal 0.0132 0.0038
Nuclear 0.0151 0.0042
Gas 0.0019 0.001
From Figure 4.19, notice that under water saving technologies (Tax-WST
case), coal generation increases slightly in comparison to the optimal tax sce-
nario (Tax case) showing that by improving their H2O usage, coal generators
are rewarded. However, see that coal generation is still lower than the No-Tax
scenario.
In Figure 4.20a, we can see an increase in CO2 emissions due to the slight
increase in coal generation after investing in WSTs. Figure 4.20b, shows a
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Figure 4.19: Supply Shares using Water Saving Technologies
(a) Total CO2 Emissions (b) Total H2O Usage
Figure 4.20: Emissions and Water Usage using Water Saving Technologies
marked decrease in H2O usage when using WSTs as expected. In addition,
Figure 4.21 illustrates the tax savings due to the investment in WSTs. It
also shows that on average there is a 49% savings on CO2 and H2O taxes
due to the implementation of close-loop technologies.
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Figure 4.21: Tax Savings
4.2.4.3 Issuing Tax Credits to Generators investing in Water Sav-
ing Technologies
In this section, we analyze the scenario where not all electricity generators
use water saving technologies. We assume that those electricity generators
using WSTs, receive tax credits to reward their investment in these tech-
nologies. For this study, we adopted a tax credit of 15% over the total H2O
tax mentioned earlier. We adopted this value based on the tax incentive
values presented in the Energy Tax Policy report [24]. Electricity generators
using WSTs are assumed to be: Coal2, Coal3, Gas2, and Nuclear generator.
Therefore, electricity generators Coal1 and Gas1 do not invest in WSTs.
From Figure 4.22, we can see that under the tax credit scenario, elec-
tricity generation from the coal generator with no WSTs is reduced, and
the difference is now absorbed by the nuclear generator. Notice that even
80
Figure 4.22: Supply Shares under Tax-Credit
though Gas1 does not have WSTs, it continues to produce as much electric-
ity as generator Gas2 that uses WSTs. This is possible since gas generators
do not consume as much water as coal generators. Figure 4.23a shows that
under tax credits, lower CO2 emissions are observed due to the reduction in
electricity generation from the coal generator with no WST. Similarly, Figure
4.23b shows that the lower H2O usage is observed since a subset of electricity
generators start investing in WSTs.
4.2.4.4 Hydro Power Generation Integration
In this section, we study the integration of a hydro power generator in the
grid. In this scenario, we assume to have one coal generator, one wind gen-
erator, one hydro generator, two gas generators, and one nuclear generator.
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(a) Total CO2 Emissions (b) Total H2O Usage
Figure 4.23: Emissions and Water Usage under Tax Credit to Generators
investing in WST
In this case, all generators have an electricity generation capacity of 100MW
each except the nuclear generator which has a 200MW capacity. The H2O
usage factor used for the hydro generator was 0.017MLH2O/MWh as pre-
sented in [93]. Given that water availability depends on the season of the
year, we have developed four different scenarios as shown in Table 4.7 ([94]).
In order to simulate the availability of water for the hydro generator in each
season, we reduced its maximum electricity production capacity depending
on the respective water availability percentage of the season under study.
Table 4.7: Water Availability by Season of the Year
Season Available Impact
Winter (January-March) ∼ 100% Above normal flows
Spring (April-June) ∼ 80% Below normal flows
Summer (July-September) ∼ 50% Below or much-below normal flows
Figure 4.24 shows the supply shares after a hydro power generator is
introduced for every season presented in Table 4.7 (Winter: Hydro-High,
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Figure 4.24: Supply Shares with Hydro Generation Integration
spring: Hydro:Normal, and summer: Hydro-Low). The hydro generator
does not produces up to its maximum capacity due to its high water usage
factor. Notice that in all cases, wind generator produces close to its maximum
capacity because it is the best solution for two of the three objective functions
(CO2 emissions and H2O usage). Coal generator produces a small amount of
electricity due to the high CO2 emission and the high H2O usage factor. Gas
generators seems to be a moderate solution and their electricity production
increases through the years. By the end of the time horizon, gas generators
produce up to their maximum capacity. Nuclear generation also increases
through the time horizon, supplying most of the increasing demand each
83
year.
(a) Total CO2 Emissions (b) Total H2O Usage
Figure 4.25: Emissions and Water Usage with Hydro Generation Integration
From Figure 4.25a and Figure 4.25b, we can see that during dry seasons
(Hydro-Low case) higher CO2 emissions and lower H2O usage are observed.
This happens because in dry seasons, the supply share from the hydro power
generator, which is the generator with the higher H2O usage factor, is re-
duced. Therefore all remaining generators increase their supply share includ-
ing the coal generator which has a high CO2 emissions factor. Additionally,
notice that in seasons with high water availability (Hydro-High case), lower
CO2 emissions and higher H2O usage are observed. In this case, the hydro
power generator’s supply share increases.
4.2.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
While climate change has driven law makers and leaders in some countries to
devise policies to reduce CO2 emissions produced by electricity generation,
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so far, only research studies like this one and some research agencies are
discussing the need to include H2O usage policies to address the electricity-
water-climate change nexus. To our knowledge, no concrete policies have
been proposed to address this critical issue by lawmakers around the world.
This paper presented a first-of-its-kind simulation-optimization approach to
obtain optimal tax rate combinations (for both CO2 emissions and H2O
usage) for a given power network and then simulated some realistic scenarios
to study the impact of these tax rates.
While studying this nexus, different trade-offs between minimization of
electricity generation costs, minimization of CO2 emissions, and minimiza-
tion of H2O usage need to be addressed. Additionally, these trade-offs may
vary across regions depending on power network characteristics and water
resource conditions, making this decision a very complex one. Therefore, we
believe that calculation of tax rates, especially for water usage, needs to be
a regional decision since water availability varies significantly across regions.
This implies that the opportunity cost for reducing water usage also varies
significantly between regions. While CO2 prices can be uniformized across
a country or perhaps even globally, once they are considered in concert with
water, they need to be jointly recomputed as generation technologies often
have conflicting CO2 emission and H2O usage factors. We address this issue
in this paper by first calculating an optimal tax rate combination for a given
power network and then performing our simulation study.
Results, as expected, show that both CO2 emissions and H2O usage are
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reduced significantly under a joint tax policy. This indicates the importance
of implementing a joint environmental policy for both CO2 emissions and
H2O usage. It was also seen that investing in WSTs is not only a good op-
tion to reduce H2O usage but also to keep non-renewable energy competitive
in the market. WSTs also reduce the risk of possible power plant shutdowns
due to droughts or water shortages that may occur. We believe that WSTs
also provide a smoother transition route to a low water usage future for crit-
ical power generators.
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Chapter 5
Future Research
Some federal and individual state-level environmental initiatives have been
introduced to increase greener power production, increase energy efficiency,
and reduce carbon emissions. Some of these plans include carbon cap-and-
trade (California cap-and-trade program [95], RGGI [96], and EU-ETS [97])
and renewable portfolio standards (in over two dozen states of the U.S.).
However, researchers, policy makers, and world leaders continue arguing
about which carbon reducing mechanism (tax or cap-and-trade) gives better
economic and environmental results. So far, Cap-and-trade has been widely
discussed as the most effective market-based mechanism to control emissions
and mitigate climate change. In fact, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency had developed a very successful cap-and-trade program in the early
90’s for SOx emissions under the aegis of the Acid Rain Program. The pro-
gram is said to have achieved its goals within cost and ahead of time [4].
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However, no federal or state level green energy policy or program includes
water-usage reduction goals even though it has been shown by several re-
searchers that electricity generation, water, and climate change are related
to one another [98, 99]. This research, in the previous chapters, contributes
to this ongoing debate by studying the impacts of implementing a Tax policy
for CO2 emissions and H2O usage on wholesale electricity markets to address
the electricity-water-climate change nexus. In this Chapter, we propose the
use of our stochastic multi-objective optimization framework as a tool to
understand the implications of implementing a cap-and-trade program on
wholesale electricity markets for future research.
5.0.6 Cap-and-Trade basics for CO2 emissions
In a cap-and-trade system that reduces CO2 emissions, a cap for the total
amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted in a time period is fixed and
it is equivalent to a limited amount of CO2 allowances. Each ton of CO2
emissions is equivalent to one allowance. A correct cap on CO2 emissions is
desirable in order to provide certainty and to achieve the emissions reductions
goals in the long term. This cap is expected to decrease annually until it
reaches the CO2 emissions target.
Allowances can be assigned to entities interested by giving them for free
(grandfathering), by selling them through auctions, or by using a hybrid
mechanism where a percentage are given for free and the rest are auctioned.
Allowance allocation is a critical component of a CO2 emissions trading sys-
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tem due to the impact it will cause in the performance of wholesale electricity
markets. Hence, policy makers have to make decisions regarding the mecha-
nism to be used for the allowances distribution, the percentage of allowances
given for free and the percentage that is auctioned, and the type of the auc-
tion to be used. Potential effects of allowance allocations in cap-and-trade
systems, such as impacts on: the overall cost, social cost, environmental
effects, prices, market power, among others, are discussed in [100–103].
Entities that are subject to the cap (e.g., power generators) are then
required to surrender allowances for their CO2 emissions. Those entities that
have additional allowances after meeting their requirement, can sell them to
those entities in need if permitted. Penalties are imposed on those entities
that exceed the limit of CO2 emissions given by the allowances surrendered.
Cap-and-trade programs provide a market flexibility to their participants
that allow them to manage the cost of compliance such as offsets, banking,
borrowing, and trading. Offsets are the processes where power generators
can compensate a portion of their CO2 emissions by surrendering certificates
of CO2 emissions reduction from elsewhere outside the cap-and-trade pro-
gram. Banking is the process that allows power generators to hold unused
allowances for future use. Borrowing is the process that allows power genera-
tors to surrender allowance from future time periods. Trading is the process
where power generators are allowed to sell/purchase allowances from other
entities. For a comprehensive review of all these parameters, the readers are
referred to [4].
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5.1 Proposal for a Cap-and-Trade system
In this section, we explain the procedure that could be adopted in order to
model a cap-and-trade program to mitigate both CO2 emissions and H2O
usage based on the multi-objective stochastic optimization framework pre-
sented in this research. The overall procedure is shown in Figure 5.1.
Initially, the auction operator fixes caps for both CO2 emissions and H2O
usage for the first time period of the program implementation as well as the
rates to be used to reduced these caps annually. Subsequently, the allowance
allocation process begins by making a decision regarding the methodology
to use for the allowances distribution. In order to provide a smooth imple-
mentation of the cap-and-trade system, it is safe to start by given away for
free all allowances available in the market (grandfathering) in the first period
of implementation. This would help to introduce the cap-and-trade system
into the market and help entities interested in getting allowances to get used
to it. For the following time periods, a transition between grandfathering
and a 100% auctioned market should take place by gradually decreasing the
number of allowances given for free while the number of allowances auctioned
increases at the same time in a fixed rate. For the sake of simplicity, power
generators are assume to be the only entities interested in bidding for these
allowances. As soon as the CO2 and H2O allowances begin to be auctioned,
power generators will have a bid decision vector for buying CO2 emissions and
H2O usage allowances. It is expected that power generators with higher cost
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Figure 5.1: Cap-and-Trade model
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of reducing CO2 emissions and H2O usage will bid higher to get the amount
of allowances needed, while generators with lower or no cost of reducing CO2
emissions and H2O usage will bid lower.
The allowance distribution could be assume to be a quarterly and sin-
gle round process as implemented in the California cap-and-trade system
[104]. Thereafter, we define Eg = {< e1g >,< e2g >, · · · , < eng >} as the
set of bidding strategies for CO2 allowances for every generator g ∈ G such
that each member is a combination of the number of allowances requested
Q and the respective bidding price P . For instance, < e1g >= {Q1g, P 1g }.
Therefore, there will be m = ng possible bidding strategy combinations
(C = c1, c2, · · · , cm) of quantities of allowances requested and bidding prices.
For instance, c1 = < e
1
1 >,< e
1
2 >, · · · , < e1G >. For each bidding strategy
combination ci (i : 1 to m), use the sealed-bid uniform method to allocate
allowances and to find the clearing price as it is used by RGGI cap-and-trade
program [105]. Based on the assumption that each generator wants to ob-
tain as much allowances as requested, we can define the amount of allowances
allocated to each generator as an objective function that have to be maxi-
mized. Hence, there will as many objective functions as number of generators
in the system. Because of this, we can make use of the Best Compromise
Solution (BCS) technique used in Section 3.6 to find the optimal bidding
strategy combination which will be the solution that maximizes all objective
functions. In case of finding a Pareto front of solutions, choose the one that
minimizes the total cost of allowances using the clearing price. This process
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happens to be the same for H2O allowance allocation. The optimal bidding
strategy combination for both CO2 emissions and H2O usage is obtained as
a result of the allowance allocation process.
In order to evaluate the effects of the allowance distribution on the whole-
sale electricity market, we can make use of the CMDP model presented in Sec-
tion 3.4 to simulate the generators’ competitive bidding behavior in wholesale
electricity markets, and solve it using the RL algorithm presented in Section
3.7 considering the respective caps for CO2 emissions and H2O usage, and to
represent the intricacies of a real power grid we can use the multi-objective
DCOPF formulation presented in Section 3.3 and solve it using the SPEA
algorithm presented in Section 3.6.
Based on final electricity production shares and allowances used as re-
sults from the RL algorithm, each generator will be asked to surrender their
allowances. At this moment, generators could consider banking, borrowing,
trading, and offset allowances depending on the market flexibility. As a re-
sult of the allowances surrender process, the operator will apply penalties
to those generators who have exceed the CO2 emissions and the H2O usage
equivalent to the allowances surrendered.
Detailed and overall results of CO2 emissions, H2O usage, operational
production cost, supply shares, profits, and locational marginal prices are
then saved for further detailed analysis. Caps for CO2 emissions and H2O
usage allowances are reduced for the next quarter (evaluation time) where
generators will bid again to get new allowances.
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5.1.1 Further steps
In this Chapter, we propose the adaptation of our multi-objective stochas-
tic optimization framework to evaluate the effects of the implementation
of a cap-and-trade system on wholesale electricity markets for addressing
the electricity-water-climate change nexus. Our model, can be also used
to evaluate the implications and trade-offs of the different allowance allo-
cation methods: auctioning, grandfathering, hybrid models; as well as the
allowances trading mechanisms such as credits, banking, borrowing, and off-
sets. Besides this, the model can be used to find appropriate CO2 emission
and H2O caps. Finally, comparison of taxation vs cap-and-trade program
can be carried out to identify benefits and weaknesses of both environmental
policy programs that would support the decision-making of policy makers
related to the electricity-water-climate change nexus.
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